By Jacob Rampino Photo Credit: Chin Human Rights Organization via AP Photo
On Sept. 10, 2023, two Russian Su-30 fighter jets arrived in Myanmar, with four more soon to follow in accordance with a contract the two governments signed back in Sept. 2022. Myanmar has been under a military dictatorship, or junta, since Feb. 1, 2021, following a coup d’etat. The junta has been accused of systematic human rights violations, including genocide against the Rohingya people, and has frequently received military aid from the Russian government.
Military aid is not the only way Russia has supported the military government either, recently committing to help the junta hold elections, which international monitors have refused to observe “in order to avoid giving an expected ‘sham’ process any semblance of legitimacy.”
This raises several questions about Russia’s strategic interests. Due to the war in Ukraine, Russia has relied on several key allies for munitions, going so far as to acquire Soviet-era artillery from North Korea. Supplying fighter jets to a nation in distant Southeast Asia seems to be in direct conflict with Russia’s current needs for the war in Ukraine. So why is the superpower supplying Myanmar?
The Pipeline
With major sanctions on Russia due to the war in Ukraine, the number of countries willing to import Russian oil has reduced considerably. The two biggest importers are currently China and India. However, Myanmar has also been importing considerably more oil from Russia than it requires, receiving 70,000 barrels per day despite only having the capacity to refine 6,000 per day. The rest of this oil goes through one of several of Myanmar’s pipelines to China.
China, India, and Myanmar own the largest shares of the pipelines, but South Korea also has a significant stake. The government-run Korea Gas Corporation and privately owned Posco Daewoo Corporation operate Myanmar’s natural gas pipelines. Though not involved in the transportation of Russian oil, both corporations are still funding the atrocities of Myanmar’s military junta, as the pipelines are one of Myanmar’s biggest revenue sources.
Rebel Groups
Several different pro-democracy forces have been actively fighting against Myanmar’s dictatorship. The largest group, the People’s Defense Force (PDF), has a strength of roughly 65,000 and is the militant wing of the National Unity Government (NUG). The NUG has been operating as the legitimate government of Myanmar in exile, composed of several former lawmakers who were ousted by the coup. The PDF has launched several attacks on the pipelines and the soldiers guarding them, hoping this will cut off the junta’s largest revenue source.
This appears to be where most of the junta’s armaments have been directed. Russian fighter jets, and large amounts of artillery, have been used on several occasions to target and suppress various rebel groups. Civilians have frequently been targeted, the pretext often being to defend the pipelines.
China has expressed concern for the security of the pipelines and has pressured Myanmar’s military rulers to crack down on rebels who threaten its energy flow. This places the junta in a precarious position, fighting rebels to maintain their legitimacy, trying to keep their primary source of revenue functioning uninterrupted, and are ultimately beholden to China and Russia for positive results.
Bloc Dynamics
Internal pressures are not the only concern for Myanmar and their allies. In addition to Myanmar’s new regime, Southeast Asia has experienced significant diplomatic divisions over other ongoing disputes in the region, namely those over Taiwan and the South China Sea. The nature of these disputes have forced many states to choose between the United States, or Russia and China.
Recent moves by the United States have increased tensions within the region. The establishment of U.S. bases in the Philippines has completed a military “arc” of Western allies around China, and normalized relations with Vietnam may lead to an arms deal between Vietnam and the U.S. that would normally go to Russia. If Vietnam and the Philippines were to permanently shift towards a foreign policy focused on America, the balance of power would sway away from Russia and China.
As a counterweight, Russia has had several diplomatic efforts of their own. The most notable instance occurred at the 2023 Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, at which Russia hosted Laos as its “top guest.” Laos has received criticism from several Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states for its support of Myanmar and China. Laos will also be the ASEAN chair for the 2024 conference, making many ASEAN members all the more concerned about Laos’ newfound influence over discussion of Myanmar’s human rights record, considering the recent visit to Vladivostok.
This uncertainty within Southeast Asian diplomacy is another reason China has been so urgent regarding the defense of Myanmar’s pipelines. Though not a significant source of oil at the moment, if the U.S. and its allies were to place significant sanctions on China, Myanmar’s pipelines fueled by Russian oil would become a much-needed lifeline outside of U.S. control. This specific geopolitical concept is known within China as the Malacca Dilemma: the concern that the U.S. could pressure its regional allies to close off the Malacca Strait, through which China brings 80% of its oil.
Why Russia Supplies Myanmar
There are some basic interests which may motivate Russia to give away crucial weaponry like fighter jets. Consistent revenue from the exportation of oil to a willing recipient has grown increasingly rare, due to the sanctions imposed on Russia for its war in Ukraine. Russia has also been a historic ally of Myanmar’s, even prior to the military dictatorship.
Still, considering all the evidence presented, there may be a more crucial and implicit reason for Russia’s continued military support at a seemingly counter-productive time.
Since the war in Ukraine began, Russia has ultimately been reliant on China, its top trading partner, and may require Chinese drones to continue its war effort. Supporting Russia in Ukraine outright could be extremely costly on the international stage for China, such that even tacit support requires concessions on Russia’s end.
Russia’s fighter jets could therefore be a key bargaining chip in the pair’s relationship, becoming a way for Russia to secure its largest supplier’s energy needs in the event that more explicit support – such as the provision of drones – incurs costs on China in the form of sanctions, or a blockade of the Malacca Strait.
Which of these explanations is Russia’s true motivator is still a matter of debate, but this tertiary theory could present a new lens for policy-makers to not only analyze through, but additionally to deter ongoing human rights violations.